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Abstract
This editorial is about weaponising the Fallacies, and offering them as active
additional components to modern formal logic, thus forming the new evolution-
ary logic for the 21st Century. Logicians since Aristotle considered the fallacies
as wrong arguments which look correct but are not. They classified them into
groups, discussed them and left them by the sidelines of logic as failures.
Modern society, with the rise of the internet, Twitter, Facebook and You
Tube showed the fallacies as most used and most effective in argumentation and
debate. If this is the way humans reason and think then we need to develop the
logical theory of the the use of the fallacies and legitimise them as a significant
component of modern reasoning.
This manifesto outlines our approach to the new logic of the 21st century
which allows for the systematic use of the fallacies in argumentation and debate
as practiced by people in the mass media.
1 Logic (up to the year 2016)
Logic began with Aristotle.1 He realised that in order to write his books he needed
logic as a tool (organon) and he wrote his five books on syllogistic logic. Aristo-
tle’s logic was refined in later periods and the next significant step came with Peter
1The Stoics invented propositional logic in antiquity, and Aristotle himself was the first to
systematize dialectic in Topics and On Sophistical Refutations.
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Abelard who worked in the early 12th century. His treatise the Dialectica [2] con-
tained new ideas such as de re and de dicto modalities. It became possible to apply
logic to language, theology and philosophy. New handbooks of logic appeared in
later centuries, by Peter of Spain, Lambert of Auxerre and William of Sherwood.
Later logicians were William of Ockham, Jean Buridan, Gregory of Rimini and Al-
bert of Saxony. The best known textbook was by Antoine Arnold and Pierre Nicole
The Port Royal Logic [3], J S Mill, A System of Logic, [61], 1843 in the 19th century.
Two points to be borne in mind about the development of logic up to the 19th
century:
• It was mainly syllogism with extras.
• It dealt with human beings, their language reasoning, their argumentation,
and their behaviour (as opposed to pure mathematics).
Modern mathematical logic was developed in the late 19th century carrying on
until the middle of the 20th century [4, 5]. There were four pillars to mathematical
logic: model theory, set theory, proof theory and recursion theory. Emphasis was
diverted from the study and application of logic to the humanities, to the study and
application of logic to mathematics and its foundations [5].
Dov Gabbay and John Woods [12], called this The Hundred-Years’ Detour. This
has changed with the rise of computer science, artificial intelligence, computational
linguistics etc. There was a strong consumer demand for devices using this new
technology. In turn, there was an urgent need to develop and evolve logic to serve
these demands. Emphasis in logic reverted back to the analysis of day-to-day human
activity. New logics were developed by diverse non-cooperating non-communicating
communities, each driven by the needs of certain types of application or device. The
landscape of logic became a chaos of different methods. New proposals for what
Logic is have been pushed forward by Dov Gabbay and colleagues, such as New
logic with mechanisms and New logic with mechanisms and networks, see Figure 2.
For an evolutionary survey of modern logical systems see [23].
The above mentioned 20th century developments (problems and New Logic pro-
posals) turned logic out of its 100 years detour, back to the modelling of the human
approach, nevertheless, it still suffers from three limitations.
1. Logic remains a mathematical, formal system which cannot come completely
to grips with human reasoning
2. It excludes the study and use of fallacies (see Section 2 below) and so ignores
the most effective human use of (fallacious) logic
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3. Worse yet, the new developments, though also sometimes applied in the hu-
manities (logic and law, logic and analytic philosophy, logical analysis of lan-
guage, logic and theology, logic and argumentation and debate), does not
include a unified coherent logical theory nor is there a perception of differ-
ences in systems of thought arising from differing cultures such as Western vs.
Islamic or Christian vs. Jewish. Frequent misunderstandings arising from such
differences are not surprising and very damaging.
There is some realisation among a few of these diverse logical research com-
munities that there needs to be more communication between them and unifying
principles are indeed being sought.
The logic with which we are familiar reflects a Western cultural way of thinking
and behaving. There are other major cultures which think and behave differently.
The following are strong communities developing the new and old areas of logic:
• The traditional mathematical logic community
• The fuzzy logic community
• The argumentation communities
• The informal logic community
• The researchers dealing with fallacies
• The non-classical logic community and research groups
• The logic and language community
• The probability and Bayesian network community
• The philosophical logic community
• The logic programming community
• The automated reasoning community
• The belief revision community
• The legal reasoning community.
Such communities of course share many common members.
There were several logicians and groups who since the late seventies tried in re-
search, conferences and social administration to encourage unification and commu-
nication among the various communities, through publishing many research books,
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a large number of handbooks and journals and many conferences, workshops and
summer schools.
Bringing communities together is not easy. A major obstacle is that the majority
of rank and file researchers work in their own restricted area and are concerned with
quick publications leading to a promotion. Even when they become established
famous and senior, some of them develop a territorial protectiveness and shy away
from other communities.
There is another, more scientific difficulty. In most cases to show a connection
requires further research and generalisation and this may take time and not be easy
to do by a single individual and may not be easily understood.
In our case we want to bring the fallacies and the argumentation communities
together by accepting the fallacies as legitimate reasoning schemas (see however
Remark 1.1 below). This is both necessary and possible now because of several
scientific and social developments:
1. Social media and internet made it clear that fallacious reasoning and pat-
terns of thinking are most effective to the extent that such ways of thought
can topple governments, influence elections and support and foster terrorism.
The fallacies have been weaponised on a large scale. Counter measure argu-
ments are urgently needed and patterns of reasoning (such as HEAL2100) are
urgently required.
This increased use of fallacies is a result of two trends. The traditional media
lost ground to social media and their moderating influence was decreasing.
Traditional media wanted to appeal/sell to maximal number of people so they
followed a middle reasonable non extreme course. The news/opinion makers
on social media was free and abundant, so to compete they adopted extreme
views as well as used fallacies and fake news to push these views and improve
their ratings.
2. Developments in big data and the internet of things give us the means to
develop the new logic. When a fallacy is encountered by a user, then he can
use a big data application to find many other examples of the same pattern
and responses to it, and thus construct his own response. Currently this is not
possible in real time.
3. Good work on argumentation and fallacies is mature enough and detailed
enough to enable us to move to the next step.
4. The outstanding technical success and applicability of the developments of the
Fuzzy community and Bayesian community is also an enabling factor towards
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the next step in the evolution of logic.2
5. Developments in theories of universal distortions and the use of logic in the
sex offenders therapist communities show the effectiveness of countermeasures
to fallacies.
6. There is an important social trend that enforces the importance of developing
HEAL2100. Traditional media (often known as “legacy media" such as printed
newspapers and TV cable and broadcast channels are declining in popularity
while their target audiences are ageing.
These are being replaced by digital media on platforms such as YouTube and
Twitter (and their successors) created by individuals or small groups with
limited budgets. Tight resources result in one person expounding to a static
camera or a couple of people discussing an issue at much greater length than
could have been allocated by a TV or radio station. Most viewers understand
that the content creators will have partisan views or a low commitment to
veracity but nevertheless an increasing proportion of the demographic below
40 years old is consuming this new media and is exposed to argumentation and
logic, to differing degrees, in a way that was not previously available. There will
be many times when consumers watch one discussion which seems reasonable
enough until they then open up the next channel and find the arguments in
the first debunked as either untruthful or specious.
Modern media has often been criticised as the death of civilisation but in many
ways it offers an opportunity for the general public to learn about argumenta-
tion in a way that has been available only to the better educated in universities
and elite schools but has not been open to the general population since the
days of the Athenians meeting on the Pnyx, See Figures 1 and 2.
Remark 1.1. We said above that we hope to bring together with us the fallacies and
argumentation communities. We need to make a quick remark here, which will be
developed fully in a later section. These communities regards fallacies in the context
of deductive reasoning. The weaponised fallacies we have identified in the media are
not only deductive fallacies but also what we now call “Action-Fallacies" (we need
to coin this new concept now). This will be defined in a later section but meanwhile
let us give a schematic explanation.
2Note, however, Gilbert Harman’s [62], a Discussion of the Relevance of the Theory of Knowl-
edge to the Theory of Induction (with a Digression to the Effect that neither Deductive Logic nor
the Probability Calculus has Anything to Do with Inference). He points out that no human rea-
soner is capable of fulfilling the Bayesian constraints. See also, independently, Woods and Walton
in chapter 1 of their Fallacies: Selected Papers, [31].
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Assume a deductive encounter between a witness and a defense attorney in front
of a Jury. Call the deductive encounter level 1 encounter. It is important for the
defense attorney to discredit or falsify or argue against the testimony. If the de-
fense attorney fails then his client may be jailed. The attorney may move to a level
2 encounter (meta-level) by arguing that the level 1 encounter should be canceled
altogether. For example the attorney may argue (fallaciously or not) that the pro-
ceedings is an appeal proceedings and no new witnesses are allowed. There are ,
however, many action-fallacies which can be used, ranging from the extreme Mafia
“fallacy" of assassinating the witness, or the lesser options; intimidate the witness,
insult the witness, drug and confuse the witness and so on. These are level 2 non-
deductive action - fallacies designed to abort the level 1 proceedings.
A real example of this is reported in Example 4.4 below.
So to summarise, when we talk about integrating the fallacies we mean action-
fallacies, which may be deductive fallacies or real actions fallacies used in a higher
level to abort a lower level..
Aristotle Syllogism, 13 fallacies
The concept of logic is based on human reasoning
Middle ages Studied as-
pects of vari-
ous languages
Studied logical
rules con-
nected with
religion
Classified and
studied more
fallacies
Mid 19th century Boole/De
Morgan
Big detour from human
based logic towards math-
ematical logic
Mid 20th century Logic for computer science
Deductive human reasoning
(problems and New Logic proposals, see Figure 2)
21st century Deductive human reasoning + integrating fallacies
Figure 1: Time-line for the evolution of logic, from Aristotle to the present
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2 Fallacies
This Section presents our views leading to the idea of integrating the fallacies into
New logic with mechanisms, networks and fallacies which we also call HEAL2100.
Defining HEAL2100 is research in progress. We do not know yet what form it will
take.
We follow several Subsections. Subsection 2.1 presents a short objective survey
of the state of affairs up to now. We found [10] very helpful and we are following
its presentation. Subsection 2.2 discusses our view/interpretation of the survey in
Subsection 2.1
2.1 Historical and current view of fallacies
Aristotle
Aristotle was the first to systematise logical errors into a list and to establish the
convention that being able to refute an opponent’s thesis is one way of winning an ar-
gument [7]. Aristotle’s “Sophistical Refutations" (De Sophisticis Elenchis) identifies
thirteen fallacies. He divided them up into two major types: linguistic fallacies and
non-linguistic fallacies, some depending on language and others that do not. These
fallacies are called verbal fallacies and material fallacies, respectively. A material
fallacy is an error in what the arguer is talking about, while a verbal fallacy is an
error in how the arguer is talking. Verbal fallacies are those in which a conclusion
is obtained by improper or ambiguous use of words.3
3Aristotle’s 13 fallacies:
I. Fallacies dependent on Language (De Soph Elen 4, 165b24-166b28)
Ambiguity (equivocation or homonymy)
Amphiboly (or ambiguity)
Combination
Division
Accent
Form of expression
II. Fallacies outside of language (De Soph Elen 5, 166b28-168a18)
Accident
The use of words absolutely or in a certain respect
Misconception of refutation
Begging the question
Consequent
Non causa pro causa
Complex question.
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1960 Traditional mathematical logics.
Intuitionistic and classical logic.
Let us refer to this asTDL, Traditional
Deductive (modern formal, classical or
intuitionistic or other axiomatic ) Logic
The traditional view of the Fallacies
is called SDF, Standard Definition of
Fallacies, See [18, p. 52]
1960–1990 Intensive development in computer sci-
ence and AI
The rise of many new logics
1980-2000 Systematizing and legtimizing many
logics
Dov Gabbay and Many
Colleagues Published
Multi volume Hand-
books of Logic
Handbook of Philosophical Logic,
Handbook of Logic in Computer Sci-
ence, Handbook of Logic in AI, and
many more.
2000
Dov Gabbay–John
Woods
New logic with mechanisms = whatever
system is working in the head of a log-
ical agent = traditional deductive logic
(TDL) + various logical mechanisms
(which arose in artificial intelligence,
theoretical computer science and study
of language during the period 1980-
2000)
See paper [12] propos-
ing the New logic with
mechanisms.
2009
Dov Gabbay New logic with mechanisms and net-
works = New logic with mechansims
+ Networks + Argumentation + Ax-
ioms + Action sequences + A variety of
Metal-level Postulates and Algorithms
Luxembourg Lecture of
Dov Gabbay. See [23]
. . . continued over the page
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Introduced in a 2009–
2017
Incredible developments of Smart-
phones and Social Media: Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, Wikipedia as well
as technical developments of the inter-
net and the emergence of the new area
known as Big Data
2017
Dov Gabbay–Lydia
Rivlin
New logic with mechansims, net-
works and fallacies (which we call
HEAL2100)= New logic with mecha-
nisms and networks + Integrated fal-
lacies
Figure 2: Time-line for Logic in the period 1960–2017
Modern times, first wave
Irving Copi in his influential textbook from the mid-twentieth century — defines
a fallacy as “a form of argument that seems to be correct but which proves, upon
examination, not to be so", see [18]. Copi lists (1961) 18 fallacies, (of which 11
are from Aristotle, also called by John Woods ([17] (1992), “The Gang of 18"4).
His view is what is known as the traditional view, SDF. This view is supported by
other distinguished researchers such as Woods [17] (1992), Walton [16, p. 179](2010)
4The Gang of Eighteen fallacies:
ad baculum
ad hominem
ad misericordiam
ad populum
ad verecundiam
affirming the consequent
amphiboly
begging the question
biased statistics
complex question
composition and division
denying the antecedent
equivocation
faulty analogy
gamblerÕs
hasty generalization
ignoratio elenchi
secundum quid.
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(Walton says that a fallacy is an argument that seems to be correct but is not),
Salmon [20], and Powers [19].
It was Hamblin [9], who wrote the first book totally devoted to Fallacies, who
first criticised SDF.5 He was followed by others. Finocchiaro distinguishes six ways
in which arguments can be fallacious. They all have deductive aspects. Finocchiaro
[51] observes that it is adequate to classify all the kinds of errors Galileo found in
the arguments of the defenders of the geocentric view of the solar system.
Gerald Massey [24], in 1987, has voiced a strong objection to fallacy theory
and the teaching of fallacies. He argues that there is no theory of invalidity — no
systematic way to show that an argument is invalid other than to show that it has
true premises and a false conclusion [24, p. 164]. By the way this is now available
(called refutation system, see [21], 2011). Note that Massey’s view/objections to
the fallacies is also deductively based, it requires a logical system generating the
fallacious arguments as well as the valid arguments.
Johnson and Blair in their textbook Logical Self-Defence, first published in 1977,
see [22] introduced new ideas for the time; the idea of an argument between two par-
ties, in the presence of audience. Their emphasis is on arming students to defend
themselves against fallacies in everyday discourse. In place of a sound deductively
valid argument with true premises — Johnson and Blair posit an alternative ideal of
a cogent argument, one whose premises are acceptable, relevant to and sufficient for
its conclusion. Acceptability replaces truth as a premise requirement, and the va-
lidity condition is split in to two different conditions, premise relevance and premise
sufficiency. Acceptability is defined relative to audiences — the oneÕs for whom
arguments are intended — but the other basic concepts, relevance and sufficiency,
although illustrated by examples, remain as intuitive.
We note the importance of the idea of self defence, which is compatible with
our view of weaponising and defending against the use of fallacies. We also note
that what they call cogent argument, which is not considered logical deductive in
traditional logic (TDL), is considered logic in our New logic with mechanisms, (see
Figure 2) because it is an instance of non-monotonic reasoning. The Johnson and
Blair defence is just a New logic with mechanisms counter argument.
To conclude this subsection it would be useful to give an example,which will il-
lustrate both an instance of a New logic with mechanisms system and an opportunity
5The term SDF was coined by van Eemeren and Grootendorst. It was the name they gave to
what Hamblin had said:
SDF: A fallacy is an argument that seems to be valid but is not so.
Hamblin made the historical claim that everyone since Aristotle held this view about what made
for a fallacy. Hansen [57] showed that Hamblin was wrong.
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for self defence.
Example 2.1. Consider the story below.
The common practice in the 1970’s in top North American philosophy depart-
ments is to find jobs for their students who just received a PhD. This is wonderful
practice to be highly praised. Our story deals with the case of one student who got
a PhD, let us call him H, (“the Hippy”), and the following is a departmental staff
discussion of whether to spend resources and effort and take responsibility for placing
H (finding him a position in another university).
Professor A (Reverend, Philosophy of Religion): We should abandon H. He is
wild, looks like a savage, and although his thesis was strong, he will either fail his
interview, or else shame us and be sacked within 6 months of being appointed.
Professor B (Social Choice Theory, H’s advisor): We still have time until the
interview. By the time of his interview, he will be presentable, shave his hair, wear
a shirt and a tie and look like a normative candidate.
Any sane person would want a good job and prepare for it and I am confident H
will do the same.
Professor A: H is too wild, it will not work. I appreciate your commitment to
your student, but the department should not be involved.
Possible replies for Professor A.
1. Argue and give evidence that H will behave.
This is compatible with the idea of Logical self defence. The defence would be
in New logic with mechansims, maybe present a detailed plan how to prepare
H and evidence that H will comply.
2. Attack with a Fallacy.
Reverend, you seem to dislike H, ever since he said that Jesus was nothing but
a political agitator! You should overcome that!
We now describe the system of New logic with mechanisms, needed to model this
argument.
i. We need a language for facts and their negations.
ii. We need a language for actions of clauses of the form:
Facts ⇒ Execute new fact and override existing fact.
iii. We can have common sense mechanisms which can take a set of facts and
expand it.
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iv. We define a consequence relation between sets of facts S and a new fact x to
be S| −x iff there exists a sequence of actions and mechanisms leading from S
to x.
The argument between the professors is about the sequence of actions proposed.
Note that this logic is practical. If you have a business and go to the bank and
ask for a loan, this is how you argue that you can easily pay it back. You present
a business plan which is a sequence of actions which can generate and maintain
income. We note here that an action fallacy can also be used, for example passing
a note to the Reverend saying that unless he immediately concedes the point his
adulterous relationship with a student will be immediately revealed.
This subsection is continued in Appendix A.
2.2 Our Initial Position on Fallacies
We first recall our our distinction between “Deductive-Fallacies” and “Action-
Fallacies” as intuitively explained in Remark 1.1. The Deductive- Fallacies are
what is commonly called Fallacies. We also recall recurring comment in Subsec-
tion 2.1, that if we consider the deductive logic against which we measure the fal-
lacies as New logic with mechanisms and networks, see [23], then the statement
below is still valid: A deductive-fallacy is the use of an invalid or otherwise faulty
argument or dialogue move which appears valid. It is important to note that an
action fallacy in say a weaker logic may become a deductive fallacy in a stronger
logic, if the stronger logic incorporates as a legitimate move that kind of actions.
We may also have a reverse change, a legitimate action in an earlier logic be-
comes illegitimate in a later logic. A striking example is the historic Trial by
Combat rule. (Trial by combat was a method of Germanic law to settle accusa-
tions in the absence of witnesses or a confession in which two parties in dispute
fought in single combat; the winner of the fight was proclaimed to be right. In
essence, it was a judicially sanctioned duel. It remained in use throughout the Eu-
ropean Middle Ages, gradually disappearing in the course of the 16th century. See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_by_combat, accessed on July 18, 1700
hours UK time)
A fallacious argument or move may be deceptive by appearing to be better than
it really is. Some fallacies are committed intentionally to manipulate or persuade
by deception, while others are committed unintentionally due to carelessness or
ignorance. Lawyers acknowledge that the extent to which an argument is sound or
unsound depends on the context in which the argument is made.
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Fallacies are among the most effective arguments used by people and are among
the most successful in affecting human actions and behaviour in social, political,
legal and interpersonal interactions.6 This being so we still have not been able to
model and understand them. To this day, logicians have dismissed them simply as
wrong reasoning and their use a sign of ignorance. See however, Woods’ Errors of
Reasoning, [56] and see the discussion in Subsection 2.1.
Fallacies are commonly divided into “formal" and “informal". A formal fallacy
can be expressed neatly in a standard system of logic, such as propositional logic,
while an informal fallacy originates in an error in reasoning other than an improper
logical form, see [9, 16, 17] and Subsection 2.1. Arguments containing informal
fallacies may be formally valid, but still fallacious.
Modern argumentation and informal logic identifies, discusses and classifies over
a hundred fallacies, [11], listing over a 100 fallacies and [59], listing 137 fallacies,
and there are hundreds (at least 500) articles about fallacies (see [60], Hansen and
Fioret in Informal Logic, 2016). See also [16, 17].
However, no one in the logic and argumentation community considers fallacies
as an effective instrument of reasoning and no one has tried to model them from this
point of view, systemise their use, offer counter-fallacies in debates and in general
turn them into another pillar of logic and language. This is not a criticism. The
tradition since Aristotle has been to regard a fallacy as a failure of reasoning which
should be avoided. However, it has become increasingly obvious to those of us who
have been studying the internet that logical fallacies have proved not only effective
in argumentation but often more effective than pure logic. We have conducted a
wide study of internet arguments, both in videos and in media such as Twitter and
the evidence presented forced us to accept fallacies as a form of dialogue, which then
prompted us to study how to integrate their use into formal theories of argumenta-
tion and logic. Furthermore our involvement with advances in the notion of logical
systems, coming from human reasoning modelling in theoretical computer science
and artificial intelligence made it possible for us to initiate the first integration of
fallacies into such models.
There has been a lot of excellent research studying fallacies among the philo-
sophical logic and informal logic communities, as we have seen in Subsection 2.1,
which essentially forms the ground work for such integration. We have no doubt
that the fallacies community at large would have reached the same conclusion as
6We have not conducted a scientific study to back up this claim. However, the second author
has been in politics for many years, (even running as a candidate for British Parliament) and has
been following debates in the social media. The first author has been following Middle Eastern
politics for years. This is the basis for our conclusion of the effectiveness and use of fallacies and
that that it is time to integrate fallacies into Logic.
1645
Gabbay and Rivlin
ourselves had they been exposed as a whole, as we have been, to internet debates
and use of fallacies and to AI modelling of human reasoning. We are going to rely
upon and use, as our starting point, the work on fallacies of prominent researchers
who devoted their lives and many books to analysing these issues. Note however
our comments on action-fallacies in Remark 1.1. We especially note the seminal
work of John Woods [56], whose brilliant analysis of deductive fallacies is a good
compatible starting point for us. See Woods’ EAUI approach [56, p. 136]. Given
this most valuable body of work, what we need now is to move to a NEW AREA
of Argumentation, Human Effective Argumentation and Logic (HEAL2100) — THE
NEXT EVOLUTIONARY STEP FOR LOGIC.
See Figures 3, 4 and Figure 5.
Fallacies
Aristotle 13 fallacies classified into 2 types, rejec-
tions and mistakes
1970 The Gang of 18
Fallacies
2008 Over 100 fallacies classified many types.
Still rejected as mistakes but analysed
and refined by a very strong and vi-
brant informal logic and argumentation
communities.
2008–2017 Powerful use of fallacies as weapons
of reasoning
2017 Gabbay–Rivlin Proposal to integrate the fallacies into de-
ductive logic.
Figure 3: Evolution of the view of the logic community on fallacies
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Why integrate fallacies?
• The use of Fallacies in interactions between humans is more effec-
tive than traditional deductive arguments; it is extensively used.
• Modelling and integrating fallacies into the New logic with mecha-
nisms, networks and fallacies can help develop logic on its evolu-
tionary path and will include new models of formal logic, practical
reasoning and practical Artificial Intelligence.
• Allows for better understanding of human reasoning and inter-
actions, as it is now (2017 and onwards) extensively used and is
here to stay in the social media. This we hope will result in bet-
ter reasoning awareness among the public, better grasp of reality,
normative laws, regulations, persuasion, political culture, etc.
Figure 4
Research activity Goals 2008
Our purpose was to propose how to integrate symbolic logic with
network (neural and argumentation) reasoning.
Let us consider the human agent in his daily activity.
We ask: what ‘logic’ does he have in his head?
Current relevant buzz words circulating in the community are,
among others: time, action, knowledge, belief, revision, deduction,
learning, context, neural nets, probabilistic nets, argumentation
nets, consistency, etc.
We want to understand what kind of integrated logic engine the
human uses in his daily activity.
Research activity (work packages) goals 2017
Add and integrate the fallacies.
Figure 5: Change in research activity
3 Big Data
The means to model the use of the fallacies come from recent advances in computer
science and AI in the area of Big Data (see [52]). The internet allows us access (in
real-time of patterns of data, such as the use of fallacies), previously inaccessible
and until recently non-existent data repositories, such as:
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• Social Media (e.g. Facebook)
• Publicly Available Sources (government , databases, newspapers, online blogs,
etc.)
• YouTube videos
• Streaming
• Advertising
• and so on.
The 2000 years of study and classification of the fallacies together with big data
and our capabilities to search and mine the extensive use of fallacies in social media
now give us the tools to embark on the next phase of our study in modelling a form
of self-protection from fallacies as well as their use as a reasoning weapon. Such
knowledge will also enable us to model cultural systems of thought — such as the
Western European, rule-based system, the Jewish Talmudic system (which played
an unacknowledged but fundamental role in the formation of Christian medieval
commentaries), the Islamic Quranic and Sharia way of thought and Hindu darsanas,
among the major ones.
The Use of Big Data. We have two main uses of big data:
1. To seek find and study the use of the fallacies in the social media.
We need this to classify their use and integrate them into logic. So we need to
use big data expert to work with us throughout the project
2. The new logic we are building will require a response to a fallacy by another
fallacy, as our examples show. So part of the logic must be a big data mining
application which given a context and a fallacy will offer candidate fallacies for
response. For example, it could be a counter example using theorem prover if
the fallacy is logical or a counter threat if the fallacy is a threat.
Also of great importance is the expected rise of the role logic and
argumentation in everyday life, as discussed in item 6 of section 1.
4 Case Study: The Fallacy of Ad Hominem
Let us start by quoting from one of the most important of Big Data resources,
Wikipedia:
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“Ad hominem (Latin for ‘to the man’ or ’to the person’), short for ‘ar-
gumentum ad hominem’, is a logical fallacy in which an argument is
rebutted by attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the
person making the argument, or persons associated with the argument,
rather than attacking the substance of the argument itself.
Fallacious ad hominem reasoning is normally categorised as an informal
fallacy, [3, 4, 5] more precisely as a genetic fallacy, a subcategory of falla-
cies of irrelevance. However, in some cases, ad hominem attacks can be
non-fallacious; i.e., if the attack on the character of the person is directly
tackling the argument itself. For example, if the truth of the argument
relies on the truthfulness of the person making the argument—rather
than known facts—then pointing out that the person has previously lied
is not a fallacious argument."
This fallacy can be further refined into a different type of sub-fallacies, depending
on the type of the attack. We chose this fallacy to illustrate how we are going to
deal with it in the new area of logic HEAL2100.
According to the discussion in Subsection 2.1, when this fallacy is used in a
debate or in argument discussion between two people, (such as in Example 4.3 and
Example 5.6), it is a violation of correct procedure in the system. This will be agreed
by the Pragma-dialectic approach, by the Walton Pragmatic approach and by the
Johnson and Blair Self Defence approach,7 as all three envisage a dialogue between
two parties. In fact it will be agreed as a fallacious move by everybody.
We have to be careful here, as the next Remark 4.1 (by John Woods) shows.
Remark 4.1 (Smoking). When 15 year old Billy says to his Dad, “But why shouldn’t
I smoke, Dad, given that you suck down 20 cigarettes a day?”, does anyone in his
right mind really think that, in saying so Billy has committed an inapparent error
of reasoning, or has broken an Amsterdam bylaw for “critical discussions”?
It is generally agreed that ad hominem remarks can be very effective modes of
persuasion. Even more so, they are entertainments designed to move the already-
convinced and tick-off the otherwise-minded. The only reason that they got on the
fallacies list is when used as premisses of arguments with generally unvoiced conclu-
sions or other missing premisses. LetÕs come back to Billy. Suppose we reconstruct
what he said along these lines.
1. Dad thinks that the anti-smoking thesis is true.
7Ralph Johnson accepts the dialogue approach but Tony Blair now does not (as of January
2017, as he stated in a CRRAR meeting, http://www1.uwindsor.ca/crrar/crrar-in-the-news).
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2. But Dad himself sucks down 20 cigarettes a day.
3. [So Dad’s practice discomports with his policy.]
4. [Therefore, the anti-smoking thesis is false.]
Of course, this is a bad argument, but nowhere close to a fallacious one. Its badness
is not inapparent, and hardly any ad hominem retort is made with the intent of this
argument.
Remark 4.1 above is a good one. There are many other cases like the smoking
example, such as the cross examining of an expert witness , where a personal attack
on the expert and his qualifications may even be expected. What we have in mind,
however, are cases where the ad hominem attack is a weapon in the meta-level
to completely destroy the opponent. It may not even be an argument. Consider
the following real examples, namely Example 4.2, Example 4.3 and the incredibly
illogical but deadly Example 4.4.
Our question is: How do we respond to such a fallacious move? Do we explain
to our opponent (the user of the fallacy) the reasons why this is a fallacy in the
context of our discussion and ask the opponent politely to make another move?
This is not what we see in Social media practice. The fallacy is legitimately used
as a weapon and the only way not to lose the argument is to respond with another
fallacy. Thus ad hominem is a good case study for us to illustrate our HEAL2100
point of view.
We start by illustrating how this fallacy can be used as a reasoning weapon.
Example 4.2 (“Milk-snatcher" Thatcher ). We quote from:
http: // www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ politics/ 7932963/
How-Margaret-Thatcher-became-known-as-Milk-Snatcher. html (accessed on
UK 1130 hours May 06, 2017)
“The Conservative government had to find substantial cuts to meet elec-
tion pledges on tax. Removing free school milk for the over-sevens be-
came the most notorious saving introduced. Edward Short, then Labour
education spokesman said scrapping milk was Ôthe meanest and most
unworthy thingÕ he had seen in 20 years. It earned Mrs Thatcher the
nickname, "Milk Snatcher" and haunted her throughout her career. In
1985 she was refused an honorary degree from Oxford University because
of her education cuts."
*After the war under Clement Attlee the 1946 Free Milk Act was passed
providing one third of a pint to all children under the age of 18.
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Edward Short’s argument was emotional and fallacious. Under traditional, rule-
based logic Mr. Short would have been expected to give good reasons why Thatcher’s
policy was wrong and Thatcher could then have responded giving her reasons for the
cuts.
However, the emotional argument and personal attack on Mrs Thatcher as a
“milk snatcher" was much more effective. The only defence which would have made
any impact on public perceptions of the situation would have been for Mrs. Thatcher
to attack the Labour Party—possibly for the devaluation of the pound in 1967 opening
the Labour Party to the charge of being called "pick-pockets" for stealing money old
people and innocent children whose pensions and pocket money was subsequently
worth less.
See: Dynamics of a Non-Decision: the Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 1964–7
TIM BALE 20 Century Br Hist (1999) 10 (2): 192-217. DOI: https: // doi. org/
10. 1093/ tcbh/ 10. 2. 192 Published: 01 January 1999 (accessed UK 1130 hours
May 06, 2017).
Instead, the Conservative government of the time stuck to explaining the eco-
nomic situation, an argument which cut little ice with the parents at the school
gates.
Had Mrs Thatcher been in possession of our intended HEAL2100 logic model,
and a big data computer at her disposal at the time and the inclination to respond
in kind she could have taken the following steps:
• Edward Short attacks Mrs Thatcher personally, using a fallacy
• Mrs Thatcher identifies the structure of the weaponised fallacy-attack
• She uses big data to find similar emotive issues around Labour Party policies8
• She finds a most similar case, although this is not strictly necessary, it could
be anything (see the example of the Starkey-Hassan argument below)
• She counterattacks by presenting a case found by a HEAL2100 Big Data search
Compare the above to the traditional deductive rule base logic behaviour:
• Edward Short presents logical arguments against the cuts
• Mrs Thatcher analyses these arguments using facts and logic
• She presents her logical counter arguments
8We do not currently have an application which can do that in real time. The projects aims to
develop one.
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Example 4.3 (You got my name wrong). This example is from a televised debate
(BBC Question Time) which is now available on YouTube and entitled: “Mehdi
(Ahmed) Hasan debates David Starkey on Question Time", https: // www. you
tube. com/ watch? v= CzYlkGbYG1M , (accessed on UK 1130 hours May 06, 2017).
Starkey starts by mistakenly referring to Mehdi by the name Ahmed.
At minute 1.23 of the video Starkey implies that Mehdi is prevaricating by point-
ing out that what he is saying in the televised debate is not what he said on the
same subject when speaking to a group of Moslems in a mosque. Mehdi replies at
minute 1.40 that Starkey cannot even get his name right, having called him Ahmed
and not Mehdi. When Mehdi makes this point, the audience bursts into loud and
enthusiastic applause.
People from Moslem societies frequently use a style of argument which is also
increasingly used by politicians and ideologues — of whatever cultural background
which we will classify as based on an appeal to emotions. This method of argument
has as its goal the winning of the argument but not the discovery of any truth or an
arrival at consensus. It is a form far better suited to all expressions of modern mass
media in which the object is to get a message across to an audience with a widely
diverse level of educational attainment and in many cases an extremely limited level
of concentration.
In the same vein, Starkey could have answered along the lines of: “Nice to know
you care about your name rather than the starving children of your people (or any
other emotive issue)." Again our big data HEAL2100 logic could have offered struc-
tural analysis and responses. Starkey would not have needed big data to make this
response but maybe there was some other additional useful related information about
Mehdi.
We are specifically studying the appeal of emotional argument to a more primitive
part of the brain because this sort of argument has extremely important implications
for how we relate to electronic media.9
Let us explain: Suppose you are of Indian descent but have had little contact
with either your family or culture for a long time. Then you walk into a house
where, as you come into the hall, you can smell curry through the open kitchen
door. Immediately you are transported back to your childhood, and are filled with
9We are grateful to Doug Walton for pointing out that this relates to what the psychologists
call heuristics, short-cuts that appeal to emotions.
The heuristics and biases research program of Tversky and Kahneman [54], (Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases) [1974] was criticised by Gerd Gigerenzer (see [55] for a survey),
and others for being too focused on how heuristics lead to errors. The critics argued that heuristics
can be seen as rational in a certain sense (bounded rationality), arguing that they can be good
enough for some purposes without being too taxing on the limited rationality of the human brain.
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memories of your mother’s cooking, family meals, rows with your sister, etc.
The sense of smell is well recognised as being wired into the most primitive parts
of the brain and smells are also well recognised as emotional triggers at a far deeper
level than any other sense.
Compare this with a scenario in which you see a recipe for curry, recognise it,
analyse it and are then reminded of your mother’s cooking. The chain of associations
is much slower and not nearly so personal.
Example 4.4 (CNN Interview). See this YouTube video: https: // www. youtube.
com/ watch? v= CBZ0C4307OU (accessed on UK 1130 hours May 06, 2017).
Katie Hopkins is being interviewed by CNN’s Hala Gorani. Hopkins attempts
to distract Gorani by referring to her first as “darling" and then, when that elicits
no response, a little later, as “honey". At this point Gorani cannot ignore it any
more and is forced to protest at the slight, thus diverting her fire from the argument.
The question of legitimacy is important here. Hopkins’ technique works well for a
woman-to-woman argument (that is, contempt between equals) but it would not be
legitimate if the interviewee were a man. Had a man called her “honey", Gorani
would probably have terminated the conversation straight away and thereby would
have “won".10
Worth watching.
Example 4.5 (Arguing with different logics). John gives the proof:
1. Assumption (c→ a)→ c
2. Assumption c→ a
3. Conclusion a
Proof: From 2 and 1 derive c and then from c and 2 derive a, all using modus
ponens
Mary objects to the proof. She says: but you have used assumption 2 twice!
John uses say classical logic but Mary uses Resource logic.
This is a simple clear example but if the differences between John and Mary are
subtle, how can Mary explain her different point of view to John. Big data can help.
10As a side matter, it is also interesting to note the degrees of pressure Hopkins employs. The
word “darling" can be used legitimately by men and women to talk to friends, especially among
media people who wish to create an illusion of friendliness with an interculator whose name they
cannot remember. Gorani would therefore find this term of address as slightly unsettling but not
entirely outside the bounds of normal usage. However, the sobriquet “honey" is never used among
friends, but only romantically or de haut en bas. Gorani could not ignore that. The first “darling",
therefore, was a testing shot, preparing the ground for the next, and fatal assault.
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Example 4.6 (The Taxi Driver-Analogy). This is a real example, that happened in
Israel. A passenger logician was returning by Taxi in a journey taking 50 minutes.
The taxi driver was an immigrant from Uzbekistan, very right wing and a supporter
of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The prime Minister was investigated for
accepting gifts (not too expensive but still considerable) from a very rich friend.
Netanyahu did not report these gifts at the time and some investigative journalist
discovered it and and the police were looking into the case. It was not a bribe, but
just wrong behaviour. The taxi driver was arguing in favour of and supporting the
prime minister.
His argument was as follows
1. What is wrong in accepting gifts from a friend?
Look at me, I wanted to meet my (male) friend from Uzbekistan, I sent him
a ticket to come to Israel, I paid for his hotel, I did everything for his visit.
What is wrong with accepting this, it is natural between friends.
The answer to that is that it is OK for your friend but not OK for the prime Minister
of a country. He should have declared everything he was receiving.
The problem with this answer was that there was no chance in Hell that the taxi
driver would understand it. He came from an ex-communist country which was still
totalitarian and the fine aspects of democracy were beyond his conceptual world. The
passenger clearly needed a better answer for him to grasp the concept, but he was in
a taxi which was about to arrive in 15 minutes and he needed to produce an answer
immediately. The passenger logician did not find the answer until the next day. It
was really simple.
2. Answer. Imagine (the passenger could have said to the taxi driver) that your
friend is a woman who in the meantime got married. Had she, without telling
her husband, come to Israel on a ticket you had bought, staying in a hotel you
paid for, and then her husband had found out. What would he think?
She should have told her husband immediately and asked for his blessing.
When in a democracy the prime minister receives gifts it is similar.
Now, had the passenger had a Big Data application, he would possibly have used his
mobile phone to search for an analogous example using the right key words.
The taxi driver could have said that the women friend case is not the same as
the prime minister case. Such a response is quite likely, but it would have offered
the opportunity for further discussion. The taxi driver, at least, would have seen
where the passenger’s attempted counter-argument is coming from. Without such or
a similar example, there would have been nothing to discuss.
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Example 4.7 (Labelling). This is a simple technique of attack; label your opponent
with a strongly emotional totally negative predicate, for example label as a racist.
There are many such labels you could use, which carry such a strong emotional
reaction that once an opponent is labelled by such a word people will reject anything
he says. Here are some examples:
• Racism
• Apartheid
• Contrary to international law
• A crime against Humanity,
etc.
The label need not be so powerful or even negative. It is enough to create a context
which weakens the opponents arguments. If we use fuzzy logic where arguments have
numerical strength, we can say something like “of course you would say so, it is to be
expected, it is in your interests to say so”. This is a generic weakening label, which
is not negative, but which will weaken the strength of the opponent’s argument. In
general there is no good answer to such generic argument, but there are exceptions.
Recently there was (June 2017) on television an interview with a politician. He
was a minister and resigned because of ideological disagreement with the prime min-
ister (no scandal or mis-behaviour), see [15]. He started his own party. In the
interview he was accused of trying to build himself a political career and possibly
aim for a government position. This is a generic labelling attack on any politi-
cian. He replied to the television interviewer, “What are you talking about? I was a
minister already”!
Example 4.8 (Prime example of labelling and counter-labelling). From an interview
on the BBC radio programme “Midweek”, broadcast on October 9th, 2005: https:
// www. youtube. com/ watch? v= Hy-Ap4LQB-4 .
Labelling is very often not direct but by implication, which is an especially deadly
form of attack. When the accusation is delivered in an oblique way it is far more
difficult to refute because before a rebuttal can be made the accused person has to put
into words the full meaning of the implication only half-suggested by the accuser.
Darcus Howe is a master of this technique and, in the opinion of the authors, he
made his living by wrong-footing the sort of people who are terrified of having even
a hint that they might harbour politically incorrect opinions.
Howe starts the interview of a famous American comedienne, Joan Rivers, with
his usual procedure of implying that Rivers has unholy attitudes — i.e. labelling her
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as being at the very least a sort of passive racist — but he frames it in such a way
that the meaning is ambiguous (“since black offends you”), this leaves him an escape
route which he takes when Rivers flies into a fury. He then posits that the “use of
the term ‘black’ offends you”.
In other circumstances this would have been effective. The accused person would
seize on the opportunity to have a conversation and would accept the lesser label of
being uncomfortable with the word “black”. Howe would retain the upper hand and
anything the accused person would say thereafter would be slightly tainted. Rivers
does not accept this. Instead she then starts labelling him, first by taking offence at
his implication she is a racist (i.e. using the argument of offence) and then saying
that he has a chip on his shoulder (that is, labelling him as unreliable because he
has an unworthy agenda). Then again she repeats that he called her a racist (“don’t
you DARE call me a racist”) driving home to the listener both that she is outraged
by such a suggestion (self-labelling of innocence) at the same time as reminding the
audience that Howe is not only being unfair but doing this with a dishonest agenda
(labelling him as unscrupulous).
Howe then suggests that it is a “language problem” which is his attempt to redirect
the discussion. This is the argument of redirection and at the very least, labelling
Rivers as being uneducated or not that bright. If Rivers had been playing the game
she would have agreed that perhaps it was a language problem. She would then have
been labelled as someone who does not understand HoweÕs mode of expression. This
would have got Howe out of trouble without an apology or explanation being necessary
and Rivers would have been weakened by the implicit racism of not understanding
Howe sufficiently well.
Again, she refuses to accept the offered compromise. She labels him “stupid”, by
defining his first statement as stupid. It is interesting that Howe does not react to
that, most people would. But if he does react, he would then have to say something
like “I am NOT stupid”. This is exactly the sort of reaction he was trying to force
out of Rivers at the outset and he knows the rules. He is also aware by this time that
Rivers not only knows the rules, too, but is a superior exponent of them. He remains
silent. Rivers then launches into an attack on his parenting responsibilities (Howe
deserted his family in the West Indies). Again, Howe does not answer this for the
same reasons that he has not reacted to the accusation of stupidity. He appeals to
the interviewer to put the conversation back on to the original track. Rivers presses
home her advantage and then accuses Howe of racism, turning the label 180 to his
direction. By that time Howe has to concede that Rivers is not a racist in order to
prevent any further attacks. Rivers finishes the exchange by stating that she would
not choose to meet Howe in any other circumstances (an unpleasant person label).
It is obvious to the authors that Rivers had done some research on Howe before
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the interview. She might have looked at his work online or spoken to someone about
what he does and was therefore ready for any reference to racism he might make. She
also knew about his deserted family. We are sure she was awaiting the opportunity
to take towering offence at the smallest provocation, providing her with the excuse
to return to him a whole list of labels. She accomplished her aim of defending herself
against Howe without using any backing to support her arguments (e.g. I am not a
racist because I have worked with black people, I have supported black artists, etc).
In this sort of an exchange, proving innocence is a weak and ineffective defence.
5 Structure of possible future research
This section gives more details about the program of work of what do we need to
do to get HEAL2100 to be accepted/adopted by the community of logicians.
5.1 Orientation: New logic mechansims and networks
Traditional logic TDL is based on rules. Even the various components of the New
logic with mechanisms and networks (see [23]) such as nonmonotonic logic is based
on rules with exceptions and priorities. Argumentation logic and dialogues logic are
all based on all kinds of procedures, algorithms and conventions. The semantics for
such logics is defined mathematically and is precise and clear
• Different choices of rules, algorithms and semantics gives different logics and
these can be rejected or can be agreed to and adopted and applied to a variety
of application areas.
• The connections between different logics and their properties can be studied
mathematically and much of the activity of the logic community is devoted to
such study.
What is happening in current modern logic (up to and including New logic with
mechanisms and networks) is basically the same as what is happening in mathemat-
ics.
Some researchers define and invent new logics, other researchers investigate their
properties, some logic communities adopt, apply and possibly even modify chosen
logics which suit their needs, giving rise to new logics. And so the cycle continues.
In many ways this cycle is just like the development of major areas of applied
mathematics: e.g. fluid dynamics. mathematical biology and other exact science
modelling,
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The operative consequences of this entire traditional modern logic activity up to
the New logic with mechanisms and networks in contrast with our proposed New logic
with mechanisms, networks and fallacies “HEAL2100" is that for any new candidate
for a logic, or for any sequence of of arguments and counter-arguments, which can
be put forward in the context of “New logic with mechanisms and networks" we can
decide on the following questions:
1. Is this candidate a New logic with mechanisms and networks acceptable system
at all?
2. What is its relationship to other known systems of New logic with mechanisms
and networks?
3. What are its mathematical properties?
4. What application it is supposed to model?
5. What constitute a fallacy in the system?
and so on.
There are many more traditional questions, (can the logic be axiomatised, what is
its complexity, its semantics, proof theory, automated deduction, etc).
To give an example, imagine that we have a program on a computer implementing
some known Artificial Intelligence New logic with mechanisms and networks. Assume
the program is corrupted by a virus and starts behaving in a new way. We can then
ask if the corrupt program is or is not a logic and we answer this question, using
the mathematical tools of New logic with mechanisms and networks to test it and
see what it does.
5.2 Our new logic HEAL2100
Let us now examine the challenges facing us in our New logic with mechanisms,
networks and fallacies = HEAL2100.
We are trying to discover what legitimises a fallacy as a method of argumentation.
This means we no longer say they are mistakes and put them aside but accept them
as instruments of reasoning. Therefore we need to explain and define when, in
HEAL2100, such uses of the fallacies are legitimate — as opposed to TDL where it
is a given that the use of the fallacies is not legitimate, so there is nothing else to say.
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We in HEAL2100 have a lot to say. Therefore let us use the term “2100-legitimate"
for correct uses of the fallacies.11
The objectives are clear, namely to integrate the fallacies into the current state
of logic, as described in the previous background section. The methodology of work
is described by way of listing work packages groups, Group A, D, B, F and I
• Group A is a work package developing a big data application. Given a key
word, say insult “you are a liar and a cheat", the application will find in real
time some examples of that.
• Group D is a theoretical research and consultation work package with the
mainly Canadian fallacies research community, trying to understand how fal-
lacies work, in order to model them.
• Group B restructures/redesigns existing New logic with mechanisms and net-
works in a way that it can accept/integrate the fallacies.
• Group F classifies the fallacies, understands them and gets them ready for
insertion into the restructured logic of Group B. This classification is motivated
by the way the fallacies are being used in social media and is likely to be
different from any traditional classification
• Group I integrates the fallacies into the restructured logic of group B to form
the New logic with mechanisms, networks and fallacies.
Note that the above is an iterated process, which we can call the ADFBI process:
We iteratively try to develop the groups: A, D, F, B, I, A, D, F, B, I,. . .
We now describe the work packages for the research Groups:
Work package for Group A. Task A1: Develop a real time search engine for
certain search phrases arising from fallacious arguments.
Task A2: Develop guidelines of how to query the application of Task A1 for different
fallacious arguments.
Task A3: Map the limitations of the use of Big Data. Preliminary searches (without
Tasks A1 and A2) were not promising. It was not like searching the web for the
meaning of a foreign word , which one can get and use instantly in a conversation.
11We need to decide how far is a fallacyÕs legitimacy conferred by community acceptance?
Wouldn’t this make for very different fallacies in Berlin and Beirut? What about sub-communities
— e.g. the South Side of Chicago compared to metropolitan Chicago? How extensively are we
prepared to press the fallacies relativity line?
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Work package for Group D. Tasks D1-D18: Discuss the nature of the Gang
of 18 fallacies, respectively each fallacy a separate respective task. This requires
careful study of the uses of each fallacy. To get an idea how it works , see our
starting preliminary study of the ad hominem fallacy in this paper.
Work package for Group B: Background Work. This is the hard work of
defining a generic New logic with mechanisms and networks system and showing how
the traditional views of the fallacies, as described in Subsection 2.1 and as further put
forward by other major researchers in the fallacy community (in work package D),
can be embedded/integrated into our generic system. Doing this requires ingenuity,
imagination and technical skill and it will take many man months to do. We can do
it, using ideas and methods from [48, 49, 50].
Work package for Group F: Classification of the Fallacies. When is a
Fallacy 2100 legitimate? To see the difficulty of classification let us look at some
real examples.
We will start with the fallacy of attacking your opponent (argumentum ad
hominem).
Example 5.1. A true case of two university professors arguing:
A1 says to A2: you are a habitual liar
A2 retorts to A1: You are an adulterer and a drug addict
Example 5.2. From an Al- Jazira debate.
B1 says to B2: I say you are a liar and a traitor
B2 to B1: B2 takes off his shoe and throws it at B1.
(This method of argument is all too common on Al Jazira, throughout the Middle
East generally and in parts of the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in some African
and Far Eastern countries.)
Example 5.3 (Two cars collide on the road). The drivers are rolling on the asphalt
trying to strangle each other. This is an incident witnessed by one of the authors of
this paper in Jerusalem 60 years ago. NO WORDS ARE SPOKEN.
Question: which of the above uses the ad hominem fallacy, Examples 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3, we consider as 2100-legitimate?
More generally, when is a use of a fallacy legitimate and when can we consider
it a step in some argument sequence? Let us be systematic in trying to answer
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this question. First of all, we need to collect data. We already have list of fallacies
grouped into types. Aristotle listed 13, nowadays we list over 100. Let us write
some steps. We rely on our results from Research Group B, because we need several
candidates for our good generic system from Group B, to inject and integrate fallacies
into them.
Task F1: Collect and classify known lists of fallacies and their fine tuning varia-
tions. Such lists exist in the literature but they are viewed and classified
from the point of view of fallacies being illegitimate and to be discarded.
HEAL2100 views them as weapons of reasoning being put to effective
practical use. Let us call this our starting list.
Task F2: We need to use the Internet to collect many instances where fallacies are
used, assess their success and reclassify them accordingly. Our research
will initially classify them as theoretically 2100-legitimate in principle,
with a view to deciding what is 2100-legitimate, pending a closer exami-
nation of how the community reacts to such fallacies. We can access big
data to collect examples and see if these can help define legitimate use.
Task F3: try to identify what cases are considered illegitimate. We will seek key
properties for 2100-illegitimate use.
Task F4: reclassify and possibly identify more fallacies in view if our findings in
Task F1–3. We will call the new list our modified start list.
Task F5 : We iterate the process of Task F1–4 several times, using the modified
fallacies collected at the previous iteration (see Task F4).
Note that this is a completely new type of work package and may take
18 months to execute.
Work package Group I: Interaction with rule based logics of New logic
with mechanisms and networks.
Many fallacies are deductive. They can be remedied within New logic with mech-
anisms and networks or they can be remedied within HEAL2100. How do the two
possibilities reconcile with one another? In practice correct reasoning can be com-
bined with fallacies. How do we view this and integrate it smoothly? How does the
interaction go? For example do we structure the argument interaction network into
a network of meta-levels (i.e. a network of networks) and the fallacies move us from
one meta-level to another?
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Task I-generic. Develop a generic integrated system with several higher levels of
reasoning and actions.
TaskI1–I10. Develop ten typical major integrated systems (we do not believe we
can have one comprehensive system, in the same way that there is no single one
major logical system).
This research can take up to 18 months
Let us give some examples:
Example 5.4 (The jump approach). This approach to be examined is where we
reason logically and then insert a step which is a fallacy and then continue to reason
logically. The simplest example of this is what is now known as “alternative facts",
in which there is an introduction of fabricated facts into an argument.
For example Soviet history books contain many fabricated or semi-fabricated Rus-
sian innovations, such as the discovery of America, the steam engine, radio and the
helicopter, amongst others. Most of these claims are hyperbolic at best but having
been established as fact, whatever argument they supported started from this point.
Example 5.5 (YouTube alternative facts ; start at 2.44m). Recently we found a
YouTube video in which it was claimed that Arabic was “the first language", and that
all the characters in the Bible (and in the surrounding non-Biblical civilisations)
spoke Arabic. The very disturbing aspect of this particular piece is that the speaker
is a University professor and obviously intelligent. We might find such concocted
history amusing but it is precisely this admixture of fact and fantasy that is killing
hundreds of thousands in the Middle East at this time of writing.
https: // www. youtube. com/ watch? v= i_ 1wZSXEofE “Palestinians: Where does
the name ‘Palestine’ come from?’
Corey Gil-Shuster
Published on 26 Oct 2016.
See also wikipedia article about alternative facts.
https: // en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Alternative_ facts .
There are many more examples and we need to study how this is done, whether
or not it is 2100-legitimate and possibly more importantly — how to deal with it.
Example 5.6 (An example of integrating a fallacy). We have a single mother who
is a top executive in a successful international corporation. Although she is busy she
is still deeply devoted to her teenage daughter. The following happens one morning:
Mother goes into her teenage daughter’s bedroom. Her instant observation is that
it is a big mess. There is stuff scattered everywhere.
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Mother’s impression is that it is not characteristic of the girl to be like this.
What has happened?
Conjecture: The girl has boyfriend problems.
Further Analysis: Mother notices a collapsed shelf. Did the girl smash it? Upon
further inspection, mother notices that the pattern of chaos shows that a shelf has
collapsed because of excessive weight and scattered everything around, giving the im-
pression of a mess. But, actually, it is not a mess, it does make some (gravitational)
sense.
There are several modes of reasoning:
1. Neural nets type of reasoning.
She recognises the mess instantly, like we recognise a face.
2. Nonmonotonic deduction.
Mother reasons from context and her knowledge of her daughter is that the girl
is not disorganised like this. She asks ‘what happened?Õ.
3. Abduction/conjecture.
She offers a reasonable explanation that the girl has boyfriend problems, since
this is common to that age.
4. She then applies a database AI deduction and recognises that the mess is due
to gravity. This deduction is no longer a neural net impression. It is a careful
calculation.
5. It could have been a neural net impression.
For example, a man who sees many shelf-collapsing cases may recognise the
pattern as if it were a face.
Mother Story Continued
• Mother to daughter: why do you leave your room in such a mess?! You should
have fixed this before going to bed last night.
Daughter’s possible logical replies.
1. I was too tired
2. I had pressing homework yesterday
3. I am in shock
etc.
Instead the daughter responds with an emotional fallacy.
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• Daughter to Mother: What do you care, you are always at work, you hardly
talk to me, you don’t care about me, all you care about is your corporate career,
you have no right to criticise me!
Given this emotional action-fallacy the mother cannot continue with any rational
deductive argument. If we consider the previous mother-daughter reasoning interac-
tion as level 1, the object level matter of fact reasoning explaining and discussing the
mess in the room, the daughter’s outburst argument is moving to level 2, a meta-level
seeking to abort any such discussion. Nothing will be effective to move back to level
1 except a counter fallacy. Once the counter action-fallacy is successful in level 2 a
rational discussion about the mess can continue in level 1.
The authors’ recommendation to Mother:
1. Look sad, tell the girl sorrowfully how hard you work to support her. Remind
her of past emotional family scenes. Tell her how much she is hurting you,
(you might even try a tear or two).
Other Options:
2. Act insulted clear up the mess yourself, then complain it has hurt your back
and you can’t go to work and blame it on her, hoping you can then talk sense
to her.
3. (Not recommended) Go into an angry fit and throw the books at her or beat
the hell out of her.
Once the chosen counter fallacy is completed, rational discussion might resume (al-
though in case 3 we rather doubt it).12
12The following is another version (by John Woods) of this example:
Mom remonstrates with daughter and daughter loses her cool and picks a fight. The fight has
some factual basis. Senior people in the corporate world have limited time for children, and children
often (but not always) resent it. This puts Mom at a clear disadvantage. Given that neither party
seeks for a permanent and irreparable alienation, the sooner this is over the better. Dispassionate
disquisition about the impact of the modern life on families isnÕt going to achieve anything quickly.
Better, then, for Mom to counterattack, and the sooner she does, the sooner theyÕll make up. After
that, as you say, a reasoned discussion might be resumed. (But probably not right then!)
You speak of these outbursts as emotional fallacies, but they arenÕt that in the traditional sense.
In the traditional sense, an argument commits an emotive fallacy when conducted in such a way
as to stir the emotions of those to which it is addressed. The argumentum ad misericordium is a
typical example, as when a defence counsel asks a jury for mercy. But in the Mother Story, nothing
like this is going on. Rather what we have there are emotional outbursts.
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5.3 Intermediate Summary and time scale of proposed research
Note that our HEAL2100 logic differs from traditional rule-based logic on two counts:
• It is not just a set of axioms and rules (whether monotonic, nonmonotonic or
any other traditional system) but a program of gathering information, clas-
sification and correlation of this information. It is an argumentation system
of attacks and counterattack where each move and countermove is justified
not by a deductive base logic but by human behaviour pattern discovered and
mined by big data.
So a logical reasoning unit is a structure of data, put together with a view to
attack. It is a weaponised structured argument unit.
The logic is what the program relying on big data tells us to respond to,
sequentially.
As the big data changes, the logic changes!
• We accept the fallacies as effective reasoning structures. We fine tune adjust
them by refining them to further reasoning substructures. We use big data
to do that as well as finding further reasoning to such instances of fallacies
from big data.The calibration of the effective counterattack to such fallacies
will be fine-tuned and enriched over time by continually maintained big data
programs.
• So logic becomes time dependent as human behaviour changes.
• We may end up in the unfortunate and uncivilised situation of reasoning only
irrationally by shooting fallacies at each other. (We do not believe so. Some
fallacies do not work in the wrong context. If I claim I can prove the famous
problem P = NP , and you ask to see the proof, it is no use me shouting “ARE
YOU CALLING ME A LIAR?"
• It can take 4-5 years of research to do this properly
5.4 Expected Benefit
• Make people more aware/critical of false news, false arguments, etc. and thus
protect our democratic processes. Now with the new media available any small
group of people can cause serious problems.
• The success of terrorist arguments to recruit ordinary people in the west can
be defended against using the same type of HEAL2100 appropriate counter-
arguments.
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HEAL2100 can be applied to all CURRENT consumer areas of logic where human
behaviour is concerned.
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Appendix
A More Background on Fallacies
The Johnson and Blair approach started the formal attempts to provide better anal-
yses of fallacies, a programme pursued by a large number of researchers, including
Govier [26] on the slippery slope, Wreen [25] on the ad baculum, Walton [27] on
begging the question, Brinton [28] on the ad hominem, Freeman [29] on the appeal
to popularity, and Pinto [30] on post hoc ergo propter hoc.
The next step came from John Woods and Douglas Walton [31], their claim is
that, for many of the fallacies standard formal logic is inadequate to uncover the
unique kind of logical mistakes in question — it is too coarse conceptually to reveal
the unique character of many of the fallacies. To get a satisfactory analysis of each
of the fallacies they must be matched with a fitting logical system, one that has
the facility to uncover the particular logical weakness in question. Inductive logic
can be employed for analysis of hasty generalisation and post hoc ergo propter hoc;
relatedness logic is appropriate for ignoratio elenchi; plausible reasoning theory for
the ad vercundiam, and dialectical game theory for begging the question and many
questions. Woods [32, p. 43] refers to this approach to studying the fallacies as
methodological pluralism.
This view is perfectly compatible with the former deductive views, provided we
understand “deductive" as “New logic with mechanisms".
Modern times, second wave
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst [34] put forward the Pragma-dialectic
approach. They start with argumentation as a procedure involving two parties trying
to overcome interpersonal disagreements. The procedure is a discussion having four
analytical stages: a confrontation stage in which the participants become aware of
the content of their disagreement; an opening stage in which the parties agree (most
likely implicitly) to shared starting points and a set of rules to govern the ensuing
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discussion; an argumentation stage wherein arguments and doubts about arguments
are expressed and recognised; and a final stage in which a decision about the initial
disagreement is made, if possible, based on what happened in the argumentation
stage.
In this context the fallacies are defined as “violation of any of the rules of the
discussion procedure for conducting a critical discussionÓ [36, p. 175].
The Pragma-dialectical theory proposes that each of the core fallacies can be
assigned a place as a violation of one of the rules of a critical discussion. For
example, the ad baculum fallacy is a form of intimidation that violates the rule
that one may not attempt to prevent one’s discussion partner from expressing their
views; equivocation is a violation of the rule that formulations in arguments must be
clear and unambiguous; post hoc ergo propter hoc violates the rule that arguments
must be instances of schemes correctly applied. Moreover, on this theory, since
any rule violation is to count as a fallacy this allows the possibility that there may
be hitherto unrecognised “new fallacies”. Among those proposed are declaring a
standpoint sacrosanct because that breaks the rule against the freedom to criticise
points of view, and evading the burden of proof which breaks the rule that you must
defend your standpoint if asked to do so (see van Eemeren [33, p. 194].
We note that the Pragma-dialectical rules of a critical discussion are not just
rules of logic, but rules of conduct for rational discussants, making the theory more
like a procedural code than a set of logical principles.13 Accordingly, this approach
to fallacies rejects all three of the necessary conditions of SDF: a fallacy need not
be an argument, and thus the invalidity condition will not apply either, and the
appearance condition is excluded because of its subjective character (Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst, [36, p. 175]. See also WoodsÕ critique in chapters 9, 10 and 11
of The Death of Argument, 2004, listed in [17].
A key point of this approach from our HEAL2100 point of view is the fact that the
Pragma-dialectical analysis of fallacies as rule-breakings in a procedure for overcom-
ing disagreements also takes account of the rhetorical dimension of argumentation.
Pragma-dialectics takes the rhetorical dimension to stem from an arguerÕs wish to
have their view accepted which leads dialoguers to engage in strategic manoeuvering
vis-à-vis their dialogue partners. However, this desire must be put in balance with
13Note however that Dov Gabbay’s algorithmic point of view included in his New logic with
mechanisms and networks, see [23], can accept certain procedures as part of logic. So according to
Gabbay, Classical Logic with Resolution formulation is not the same logic as Classical Logic with
Tableaux formulation. To the extent that the Pragma-dialectical approach with its procedures can
be embedded/represented within New logic with mechanisms and networks, then we can still main-
tain the view that Fallacies are “New logic with mechanisms and networks movements/arguments”
that are actually not New logic with mechanisms and networks correct but nevertheless do look
correct".
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the dialectical requirement of being reasonable; that is, staying within the bounds of
the normative demands of critical discussions. The ways of strategic manoeuvring
identified are basically three: topic selection, audience orientation, and the selection
of presentational devices, and these can be effectively deployed at each stage of argu-
mentation (Van Eemeren, [33, p. 94]). “All derailments of strategic manoeuvering
are fallacies”, writes van Eemeren [33, p. 198], “in the sense that they violate one or
more of the rules for critical discussion and all fallacies can be viewed as derailments
of strategic manoeuvering”. This means that all fallacies are ultimately attributable
to the rhetorical dimension of argumentation since, in this model, strategic manoeu-
vering is the entry of rhetoric into argumentation discussions. “Because each fallacy
has, in principle, sound counterparts that are manifestations of the same mode of
strategic manoeuvering” it may not appear to be a fallacy and it “may pass unno-
ticed” ([33, p. 199]. Nevertheless, Pragma-dialectics prefers to keep the appearance
condition outside the definition of ‘fallacyÕ, treating the seeming goodness of falla-
cies as a sometime co-incidental property, rather than an essential one.
Our point of view is to accept/ integrate (in HEAL2100) some uses of these
fallacies as correct integrated moves, to be countered by other fallacies.
We note that in our New Logic 2, [23] we include argumentation and network
logics as well as Algorithmic Proof theory and so the Pragma-Dialectic approach
can be simulated/included in our system. However New Logic 2 supports a plurality
of Logics and so it will not agree with Pragma-dialectical approach looking towards
a single ideal model of argumentation. We view each argumentation procedure is
another New Logic 2 system, hopefully usable in some application area.
Another important second wave approach to fallacies is the work of Biro [37, pp.
265–66]. The way we understand his examples is that in order for an argument not
to be a fallacy , the assumptions are required to have factual verification or general
acceptance as facts. Biro calls this epistemic seriousness. He gives the following
example:
All members of the committee are old Etonians;
Fortesque is a member of the committee;
Fortesque is an old Etonian.
In this example, given the minor premise, the major cannot be known to be true
unless the conclusion is known to be true. Consequently, on the approach to fallacies
taken by Biro, the second argument, despite the fact that it is valid, is non-serious, it
begs the question, and it is a fallacy. If there was some independent way of knowing
that the major premise was true, such that it was a bylaw that only old Etonians
could be committee members, the argument would be a serious one, and not beg
the question. This approach does not insist that all justification must be deductive,
but facts must be verifiable. Thus it allows for arguments the possibility of their
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being fallacies (as well as good arguments) by non-deductive standards, something
precluded by SDF.
We consider this idea important because watching many debates on YouTube
we find a lot of false unverifiable alternative facts being introduced. See Example
5.5 below.
We now address the pragmatic approach of Doug Walton. Doug Walton has
written or edited over forty-five books about fallacies, analysing them one by one,
following the Woods-Walton first wave view on fallacies. As we see it, Walton re-
sponded to the Pragma-dialectic approach by offering considering argumentation
dialogues. On the Walton approach, a fallacy is associated with a small local se-
quence of dialogue called a profile of dialogue. See [53]. This paper builds the
profiles of dialogue tool into a fault diagnosis method that can be applied to prob-
lematic examples of argumentation such as those involving informal fallacies. The
profiles method works by comparing a descriptive graph with a normative graph.
The descriptive graph represents how a dialogue sequence actually went in the ex-
ample chosen for analysis. The normative graph represents an analysis of how the
sequence should ideally proceed, according to the protocols (rules) for this type
of dialogue. The descriptive graph is mapped into the normative graph, so that
a comparison can be made to diagnose the fault in the sequence displayed in the
descriptive graph. and repair it.
These are distinct normative dialectical frameworks (persuasion dialogue, inquiry
dialogue, negotiation dialogue, etc.) rather than the single model of a critical dis-
cussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics. Postulating different kinds of dialogues with
different starting points and different goals, Walton claims, will bring argumentation
into closer contact with argumentation reality. So fallacies happen when there is an
illegal shift from one kind of a dialogue to another [38, pp. 118–23], for example,
using arguments appropriate for a negotiation dialogue in a persuasion dialogue.14
So if I am a medical expert witness and I am asked to describe what procedures
I used on the patient, I might take offence and say
Are you calling me a liar?
However, if I claim at a conference that I solved an open problem in maths (say
P = NP?), and I am asked for the idea of the proof, I cannot say
Are you calling me a liar?
The definition of fallacy Walton proposes [38, p. 255] has five parts. A fallacy:
14Note however that the view that fallacies are due to illicit dialogue shifts is pretty well aban-
doned in [38].
On WaltonÕs definition, no inference can be fallacious, unless an inference is a solo argument in
which the roles of each contending party is played by the same person.
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1. an argument (or at least something that purports to be an argument) that
2. falls short of some standard of correctness;
3. is used in a context of dialogue;
4. has a semblance of correctness about it; and
5. poses a serious problem to the realisation of the goal of the dialogue.
Let us stress that Walton’s approach depends on context, not on structure alone.
Our tolerance of the above claim, “you are calling me a liar", depends also on context
and not only on its irrelevant meta-level (personal) aspect. The Pragma-dialectic
approach can string together several of Walton schemes to form a logic and then
claim a fallacy if they are not put together correctly. Both approaches can be
embedded in the New logic with mechanisms and networks concept.
Modern times: issues in fallacy theory
Quoted from the scholarly and most valuable article “Fallacies" in the Stanford
Encyclopaedia of philosophy (SEP by H. V. Hansen) There are four major questions
to be addressed by the Fallacies research community according to SEP:
• The nature of fallacies
• The appearance condition
• Teaching of Fallacies
• The role of Biases
Since this is the view (according to SEP/H. V. Hansen) of how the current fallacies
research community would like to go forward, we think it is best to simply integrate
and almost quote what SEP says about these plans. In the next subsection we will
present our own plans for integrating the fallacies and compare with the fallacies
communities plans. We hope and look forward for co-operation. Our own comments
in the quote are in boldface
The nature of fallacies
A question that continues to dog fallacy theory is how we are to con-
ceive of fallacies. There would be advantages to having a unified theory
of fallacies. It would give us a systematic way of demarcating fallacies
and other kinds of mistakes; it would give us a framework for justifying
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fallacy judgments, and it would give us a sense of the place of fallacies in
our larger conceptual schemes. Some general definition of ÔfallacyÕ is
wanted but the desire is frustrated because there is disagreement about
the identity of fallacies. Are they inferential, logical, epistemic or dialec-
tical mistakes? Some authors insist they are all of one kind: Biro and
Siegel, for example, that they are epistemic, and Pragma-dialectics that
they are dialectical. There are reasons to think that all the fallacies do
not easily fit into one category.
. . .
In the community fallacies have been identified in relation to
some ideal or model of good arguments, or good argumentation,
or rationality.
Aristotle’s fallacies are shortcomings of his ideal of deduction and proof,
extended to contexts of refutation. The fallacies listed by Mill are er-
rors of reasoning in a comprehensive model that includes both deduction
and induction. Those who have defended SDF as the correct defini-
tion of ‘fallacy’ take logic simpliciter or deductive validity as the ideal
of rationality. Informal logicians view fallacies as failures to satisfy the
criteria of what they consider a cogent argument. Defenders of the epis-
temic approach to fallacies see them as shortfalls of the standards of
knowledge-generating arguments. Finally, those who are concerned with
how we are to overcome our disagreements in a reasonable way will see
fallacies as failures in relation to ideals of debate or critical discussions.
We note that the authors (Gabbay-Rivlin) approach to fallacies
(which we may call New logic with mechanisms, networks and
fallacies approach), is that we consider a fallacy any effective
instrument of argumentation currently used in the social media
and politics which is not a New logic with mechanisms and
networks instrument!
The standard treatment of the core fallacies did not emerge from a sin-
gle conception of good argument or reasonableness but has rather, like
much of our unsystematic knowledge, grown as a hodgepodge collection
of items, proposed at various time and from different perspectives, that
continues to draw our attention, even as the standards that originally
brought a given fallacy to light are abandoned or absorbed into newer
models of rationality. Hence, there is no single conception of good ar-
gument or argumentation to be discovered behind the core fallacies, and
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any attempt to force them all into a single framework, must take efforts
to avoid distorting the character originally attributed to each of them.
The appearance condition
From Aristotle to Mill the appearance condition was an essential part
of the conception of fallacies. However, some of the new, post-Hamblin,
scholars have either ignored it (Finocchiaro, Biro and Siegel) or rejected
it because appearances can vary from person to person, thus making the
same argument a fallacy for the one who is taken in by the appearance,
and not a fallacy for the one who sees past the appearances. This is
unsatisfactory for those who think that arguments are either fallacies or
not. Appearances, it is also argued, have no place in logical or scientific
theories because they belong to psychology (van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst, [36]. But Walton (e.g., [39]) continues to consider appearances an
essential part of fallacies as does Powers [19, p. 300] who insists that fal-
lacies must “have an appearance, however quickly seen through, of being
valid.Ó If the mistake in an argument is not masked by an ambiguity
that makes it appear to be a better argument than it really is, Powers
denies it is a fallacy.
The appearance condition of fallacies serves at least two purposes. It
can be part of explanations of why reasonable people make mistakes in
arguments or argumentation: it may be due in part to an argument’s
appearing to be better than it really is. The appearance condition also
serves to divide mistakes into those that are trivial or the result of care-
lessness for which there is no cure other than paying better attention,
and those which we need to learn to detect through increased knowledge
of their seductive nature. Without the appearance condition, it can be
argued, no division can be made between these two kinds of errors: either
there are no fallacies or all mistakes in argument and/or argumentation
are fallacies, a conclusion that some are willing to accept, but which runs
contrary to tradition. One can also respond that there is an alternative
to using the appearance condition as the demarcation property between
fallacies and casual mistakes, namely, frequency: fallacies are those mis-
takes we must learn to guard against because they occur with noticeable
frequency. To this it may be answered that Ônoticeable frequencyÕ is
vague, and is perhaps best explained by the appearance condition.
Teaching
On the more practical level, there continues to be discussion about the
value of teaching the fallacies to students. Is it an effective way for them
1678
HEAL20100
to learn to reason well and avoid bad arguments? One reason to think
that it is not effective is that the list of fallacies is not complete, and
that even if the group of core fallacies was extended to incorporate other
fallacies we thought worth including, we could still not be sure that we
had a complete prophylactic against bad arguments. Hence, we are bet-
ter off teaching the positive criteria for good arguments/ argumentation,
which will give us a fuller set of guidelines for good reasoning. But some
(Pragma-dialectics and Johnson and Blair) do think that their stock of
fallacies is a complete guard against errors because they have specified a
full set of necessary conditions for good arguments/argumentation and
they hold that fallacies are just failures to meet one of these conditions.
Another consideration about the value of the fallacies approach to teach-
ing good reasoning is that it will tend to make students overly critical
and lead them to see fallacies where there aren’t any; hence, it is main-
tained we could better advance the instilling of critical thinking skills by
teaching the positive criteria of good reasoning and arguments (Hitch-
cock, [40]). In response to this view, it is argued that, if the fallacies are
taught in a non-perfunctory way which includes the explanations of why
they are fallacies — which normative standards they transgress — then a
course taught around the core fallacies can be effective in instilling good
reasoning skills (Blair [41]).
We have a new method of teaching called DADI ( Data Driven
Instruction) which can be used for teaching about the Fallacies.
See Appendix C
Biases
Recently there has been renewed interest in how biases are related to fal-
lacies. Correia ([42]) has taken Mill’s insight that biases are predisposing
causes of fallacies a step further by connecting identifiable biases with
particular fallacies. Biases can influence the unintentional committing of
fallacies even where there is no intent to be deceptive, he observes. Tak-
ing biases to be Òsystematic errors that invariably distort the subjectÕs
reasoning and judgment,Ó the picture drawn is that particular biases are
activated by desires and emotions (motivated reasoning) and once they
are in play, they negatively affect the fair evaluation of evidence. Thus,
for example, the Òfocussing illusionÓ bias inclines a person to focus on
just a part of the evidence available, ignoring or denying evidence that
might lead in another direction. Correia ([42, p. 118]) links this bias to
the fallacies of hasty generalization and straw man, suggesting that it is
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our desire to be right that activates the bias to focus more on positive
or negative evidence, as the case may be. Other biases he links to other
fallacies.
Thagard [43] is more concerned to stress the differences between fallacies
and biases than to find connections between them. He claims that the
model of reasoning articulated by informal logic is not a good fit with the
way that people actually reason and that only a few of the fallacies are
relevant to the kinds of mistakes people actually make. Thagard’s argu-
ment depends on his distinction between argument and inference. Argu-
ments, and fallacies, he takes to be serial and linguistic, but inferences
are brain activities and are characterized as parallel and multi-modal. By
“parallel” is meant that the brain carries out different processes simul-
taneously, and by “multi-modal” that the brain uses non-linguistic and
emotional, as well as linguistic representations in inferring. Biases (in-
ferential error tendencies) can unconsciously affect inferring. “Motivated
inference”, for example, “involves selective recruitment and assessment
of evidence based on unconscious processes that are driven by emotional
considerations of goals rather than purely cognitive reasoning” [43, p.
156]. Thagard volunteers a list of more than 50 of these inferential er-
ror tendencies. Because motivated inferences result from unconscious
mental processes rather than explicit reasoning, the errors in inferences
cannot be exposed simply by identifying a fallacy in a reconstructed ar-
gument. Dealing with biases requires identification of both conscious
and unconscious goals of arguers, goals that can figure in explanations of
why they incline to particular biases. “Overcoming peopleÕs motivated
inferences”, Thagard concludes, “is therefore more akin to psychother-
apy than informal logic” [43, p. 157], and the importance of fallacies is
accordingly marginalized.
In response to these findings, one can admit their relevance to the ped-
agogy of critical thinking but still recall the distinction between what
causes mistakes and what the mistakes are. The analysis of fallacies
belongs to the normative study of arguments and argumentation, and
to give an account of what the fallacy in a given argument is will in-
volve making reference to some norm of argumentation. It will be an
explanation of what the mistake in the argument is. Biases are rele-
vant to understanding why people commit fallacies, and how we are to
help them get past them, but they do not help us understand what the
fallacy-mistakes are in the first place — this is not a question of psychol-
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ogy. Continued research at this intersection of interests will hopefully
shed more light on both biases and fallacies.
B Applications: Internet of Things
This is a possible application. It is not essential or influential to our new concept of
2100-logic, but it is related and who knows what its future impact could turn out
to be.
From Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things
“The Internet of things (IoT) is the inter-networking of physical devices,
vehicles (also referred to as “connected devices" and "smart devices"),
buildings, and other itemsÑembedded with electronics, software, sen-
sors, actuators, and network connectivity that enable these objects to
collect and exchange data. In 2013 the Global Standards Initiative on
Internet of Things (IoT-GSI) defined the IoT as “the infrastructure of the
information society." The IoT allows objects to be sensed or controlled
remotely across existing network infrastructure, creating opportunities
for more direct integration of the physical world into computer-based
systems, and resulting in improved efficiency, accuracy and economic
benefit in addition to reduced human intervention. When IoT is aug-
mented with sensors and actuators, the technology becomes an instance
of the more general class of cyber-physical systems, which also encom-
passes technologies such as smart grids, smart homes, intelligent trans-
portation and smart cities. Each thing is uniquely identifiable through
its embedded computing system but is able to interoperate within the ex-
isting Internet infrastructure. Experts estimate that the IoT will consist
of almost 50 billion objects by 2020.
Typically, IoT is expected to offer advanced connectivity of devices, sys-
tems, and services that goes beyond machine-to-machine (M2M) com-
munications and covers a variety of protocols, domains, and applications.
The interconnection of these embedded devices (including smart objects),
is expected to usher in automation in nearly all fields, while also enabling
advanced applications like a smart grid, and expanding to areas such as
smart cities.
Equipped with HEAL2100 we can offer better logic at the service of the IOT.
The IOT systems are complex inter-related components each of which are intelligent
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to some degree and based on logic. The need of HEAL2100 for IOT is a necessity
not just another application!
We give an Example:
Imagine we want to improve protection against Phishing. If we use traditional logic
in building protection we use rules, as in the following case: Email filters: a message
you receive is analysed by the mail program which then adds to the subject line a
warning that this may be phishing or spam. Such warnings already exist.
If we open the email and we see a very convincing service message from Paypal
that our account has they paid $30 to an unfamiliar company, we then have to
consider whether the message is or is not malicious. However, our reaction to this
unexplained apparent disappearance of money from our account is emotional, faster
and more immediate than reasoning. Worried that even more money will disappear
and seeing a button saying “cancel transaction" it is quite likely that we would be
panicked into clicking on it almost before we realise what is happening.
What we need is an equally emotional warning, like a flashing button in red and
yellow blinking the message “SPAM—STAY AWAY!" It may not be difficult for a
mail program to do this if it realises the underlying principles of our HEAL2100
logic — that is that the object is TO WIN, not to reach a consensus.
C DADI: Data Driven Instruction, A New Method of
Teaching Logic and Fallacies
We developed a new teaching method capable of writing joint research papers with
first year students as joint authors. The philosophy of the teaching/research ap-
proach is outlined below.
It is especially suited for teaching logic and fallacies.
We observed that Phd students conducting research for the purpose of writing a
thesis, need to go through four stages:
1. read and familiarise themselves with a relevant area of research;
2. have a good new idea for pushing the frontier of the area forward;
3. develop the details of the idea;
4. write it down as a paper/thesis, and this includes knowing the scientific lan-
guage and structure for writing their ideas.
The received wisdom about Phd studies is that you need 3 (BSc)–4 (MSc) years
of university study to be able to approach a thesis.
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We conjectured that the 3–4 years are required for item 1 above.
We asked ourselves, what if the area where the research to be done is so familiar
that first year student already have the background knowledge to move to item 2
above?
Can first year students have a good new idea leading to a research paper?
Of course first year students do not know how to write a paper nor do they
know any research methodology, but neither do PHd students — for this we have a
supervisor. So all we need to experiment with this idea is to choose a topic which
• First year students are familiar with
• Good ideas are forthcoming
• It connects with known international research area.
Then all we need to do is for say, Dov, to present the question to the students
and let them develop a model. This is no different from offering a topic of research
to a new Phd student. Dov Gabbay accepted teaching at Ashkelon Community
College and conducted such courses.
Description of the experiment:
Class of 2015/2016. In 2015 Gabbay was teaching general logic to a first year
class of 15 students. At the time there was much debate in the media and politics
in UK and Israel, about young couples unable to join the housing ladder. In simple
words:
Flats are too expensive and young couples cannot get the initial minimum funds to
enable them to get an affordable mortgage to buy a home. The political solution
was to offer such young couples cheap mortgages and help.
Gabbay asked the student to formulate principles (known from the media) for
qualifying for this help Using one arrow connective
(If x is true and y is true) ⇒ do z.
Gabbay formulated known rules from the media based on government data. Then
he posed a problem to the class: How to stop young couples from using the benefits
and buying two flats in parallel? The class participated in modifying the rules to
stop such abuse. There were creative in cheating the system as well as creative in
fixing it.
The reader will observe that Gabbay developed action logic and cyber security
principles for guarding against hacking. Gabbay applied the systems we got for
the cyber security intelligent home and wrote the paper [45]. We were invited to
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submit to an OUP international Journal, on Cyber Security. The key to this is that
the students knew how to write rules and knew how to cheat the system — they
understood the need to get your own flat and were creative in dealing with it.
Class of 2016/2017. This year the first class had 49 students. We again chose
a familiar topic to the students. This year the media and the law was concerned in
Israel and UK with sex offenders. Many famous figures were accused by victims of
sex offences and every week there was a new scandal discovered. The students had
detailed knowledge of such cases. Dov Gabbay presented the question ofHow many
complaints does it take for us to decide that there is need to investigate?
The view was of a survival game of the sex offenders where each offender had a
number of lives before it is dead. The students were also familiar with T.V. survival
games. So we started developing a model based on their knowledge of the numerous
sex offender cases going on in the media. We developed a basic model in the area
of argumentation. We wrote papers [46, 47] and are invited to submit to the IOS
journal Argument and Computation.
The students are able to develop points *1–*3 above and the teacher needs to
write point *4.
NOTE THAT THE DADI METHOD IS ESPECIALLY SUITABLE
FOR TEACHING FALLACIES BECAUSE NOWADAYS THE SOCIAL
MEDIA IS FULL OF DEBATES AND POLITICS AND ISIS, ETC US-
ING FALLACIES AS WEAPONS. THE STUDENTS ARE VERY FA-
MILIAR WITH THEM.
Limitations of the method.
1. The students cannot deal with abstraction. So if they construct a model for
a certain area (with which they are familiar), they cannot recognise the same
abstract model in another area, even when the similarities are clearly pointed
out to them.
The students recognised and defined the many lives abstract argumentation
model in the sex offenders area. The same model applies in the nutrition area,
where various foods (e.g. alcohol) attack parts of the body (e.g. the liver).
This was pointed out to them and they were given a lecture by a nutritionist
and yet they did not see the connection.
2. The students found difficulty in understanding abstract set theoretical defini-
tions but could easily understand definitions by algorithms. So to define a set
we must give an algorithm for constructing it.
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3. The best approach to teaching/developing a theory or a model is to present it
as an algorithmic game or a puzzle.
4. We plan to address the use of some of the fallacies (ad hominem) in the class of
2017/2018. The students are familiar with political debates, personal attacks
and counterattacks especially in the Trump era. It is a strategic survival game
and we shall see if next year’s students can model it.
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